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The Un fore seen De fec tion
Ro ma nia’s Dis en gage ment from the Fi nal So lu tion*
MIHAI CHIOVEANU
”The last day of the year…I carry in side my self the 364 ter ri ble
days of the dread ful year we are clos ing to night. But we are alive.
We can still wait for some thing. There is still time; we still have some time left”
Mi hail SEBASTIAN, De cem ber 31, 1941
”The Jews in the Gen eral Gov ern ment, be gin ning in Lub lin
are now be ing evacu ated to the east. This is a pretty
bar baric pro ce dure, not to be de scribed here more pre cisely,
and of the Jews them selves not much will re main…
No other gov ern ment and no other re gime would have
the strength to solve this ques tion com pre hen sively”
Jo seph GOEBBELS, March 27, 1942
”Para doxi cally, the coun try which ran Ger many a close sec ond in mas sa cring 
Jews was also the coun try in which more Jews sur vived than any where else in oc-
cu pied Europe. Sub jected to dis crimi na tion, crip pling fi nan cial ex ac tions and com-
pul sory la bor, the Jews were none the less spared”1. To my knowl edge, no other 
scholar suc ceeded to en cap su late in a more com pre hen sive and ac cu rate way this 
par ticu lar epi sode of the Ro ma nian (and Euro pean) Holo caust that con tin ues to 
fas ci nate the reader and trou ble the his to rian’s mind. Though many Holo caust stu-
dents be fore and af ter Mi chael Bur leich ac cepted the chal lenge, em bark ing on the 
ef fort to solve this par ticu lar ”un an swered ques tion”, most failed, barely dedi cat-
ing one sen tence, or a para graph at best, to this yet an other para dox in Ro ma nia’s 
mod ern his tory2. All in all, six dec ades af ter the events, but few his to ri ans suc-
ceeded to grasp the set of ele ments that al to gether pro vide us with an ade quate ex-
pla na tion for Ro ma nia’s grad ual shift from to tal com mit ment to out right de fi ance 
to ward the Nazi Fi nal So lu tion3.
Not sur pris ingly, be fore and some times even af ter 1989, Ro ma nian his to ri og-
ra phy paid much more at ten tion to this epi sode. Yet, the goal was dif fer ent this 
* The author expresses his gratitude to Professor Armin Heinen (University of Aachen) and 
Professor Daniel Barbu (University of Bucharest) for their suggestions and comments.
1 Michael BURLEICH, The Third Reich, A New History, Pan Books, London, 2001, pp. 658-659.
2 See Martin GILBERT, Holocaust. A History of the Jews of Europe During the Second World War, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1985, p. 637; Robert S. WISTRICH, Hitler and the Holocaust, 
A Modern Library Chronicles Book, New York, 2003, p. 157; Laurence REES, Auschwitz. A New 
History, PublicAffairs, New York, 2005, p. 210.
3 See Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, Quandrangle, Chicago, 1961, 
pp. 682-702; Jean ANCEL, ”Plans for Deportation of the Rumanian Jews and Their Discontinuation 
in Light of Documentary Evidence (July-October 1942)”, in Michael R. MARRUS (ed.), The Nazi 
Holocaust. Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews, Meckler, Westport, London, 1989, 
pp 334-373; Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu, Editura Hassefer, Bucureşti, 1998, 
pp. 325-339; Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report. International 
Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, Polirom, Iaşi, 2005, pp. 168-172. 
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time, rather ideo logi cal and po liti cal. Ro ma nian his to ri ans spot ted the light on the 
ef forts of the Ro ma nian gov ern ment to re sist and foil the Ger man Fi nal So lu tion in 
as much as to resil iently claim that, unlike in other Euro pean coun tries, in Ro ma nia, 
Jews were pro tected by Ion An tonescu and his re gime and thus, saved. To gether 
with the emi gra tion pol icy that was still ”en cour aged” by the gov ern ment, and the 
ab sence of gas cham bers on Ro ma nia’s ter ri tory, the fact that most Ro ma nian Jews 
within the Old King dom (Re gat), South ern Tran syl va nia and Ba nat, around 300 
thou sands souls, did not reached the fac to ries of death in Po land was bla tantly 
turned into an ir refu ta ble ar gu ment for the de nial of Holo caust in Ro ma nia1.
The aim of the pre sent text is not to over come the myth of a Sec ond World 
War Ro ma nia as a ”ha ven for Jews”, at least from late 1942 on ward, and when com-
pared with other Euro pean coun tries such as Hun gary, Slo va kia, Croa tia, France 
and Hol land. Also, it is not my in ten tion to sim ply point out that Ro ma nian Jews 
were not saved but rather spared, with the lat est term de scrib ing truth fully the 
fate of a con sid er able part of the Ro ma nian Jewry. None the less, both is sues will be 
touched upon.
My chief in ter est is with de line at ing the rea sons and mo ti va tions be hind the de-
ci sion of the Ro ma nian gov ern ment not to hand over half of the Jews to the Na zis. 
Con trary to what oth ers might think, I con sider that un der stand ing the de ci sion-mak-
ing proc ess, and the stra te gic logic of the per pe tra tors, is no less es sen tial than the fi-
nal out come, the for tui tous (in many re spects) sur vival of the al ready tar geted 
vic tims2. The ma jor risk of not do ing so would be to con tinue with the some what sim-
plis tic, ”in ten tion al ist” ap proach that re duces eve ry thing to Ion An tonescu’s per son-
al ity, and as to credit the Ro ma nian dic ta tor alone with the ”merit” to halt the 
de por ta tion, thus ”sav ing” the Ro ma nian Jews – An tonescu him self stated dur ing 
his 1946 trial that the Ro ma nian Jews were still alive thanks to him3.
Aware of the im por tance of the mi cro-level per pe tra tors, the level were geno-
cide ac tu ally takes place, I de cided not to fo cus on the en tire chain of com mand 
but solely on the macro-level per pe tra tors. Geno cide stu dents con sider this level 
to be far more im por tant as ”blue prints are drawn here, se rial mass kill ing out-
lined, and geno cidal men tal ity shaped some times only to be lat ter fil tered down”4. 
In other words, the top de ci sion-mak ers are the ones that can gear or con versely 
stop the ”ma chin ery of de struc tion”. Lim ited at ten tion is given to the by stand ers, 
and even less to the vic tims, ex cept, briefly, the Jew ish lead ers and their ef forts to 
res cue the rem nants of their com mu nity at large. Though, it is not my in ten tion to 
turn Mi hail Sebas tian into a para dig matic case, I took the time to go, once more, 
through his di ary, an ex cel lent tes ti mony of the deso late status of Ro ma nian Jewry, 
whose situa tion de te rio rated over time, ”re galed” as they were with end less hate-filed 
speeches, shabby treat ment by au thori ties and neighbors, and con tri bu tions reach ing 
stag ger ing amounts of money. Iso lated, per se cuted, lis ten ing on Ra dio Hit ler’s 
1 Bela VAGO, ”The Destruction of Romanian Jewry in Romanian Historiography”, in Yisrael 
GUTMAN, Gideon GREIF (eds.), The Historiography of the Holocaust Period, Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, 
1988, pp. 405-406, 411, 415. See also Gheorghe ZAHARIA, Nicolae COPOIU, ”The Situation of the 
Jews of Romania, 1938-1944, as reflected in Romanian Historiography”, in Ibidem, p. 427.
2 See Dinu C. GIURESCU, România în al doilea război mondial, Editura All, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 146.
3 Sorin ALEXANDRESCU, Paradoxul român, Editura Univers, Bucureşti, 1998, pp. 155-156.
4 Robert GELLATELY, ”The Third Reich, the Holocaust, and Visions of Serial Genocide”, in 
Robert GELLATELY, Ben KIERNAN (eds.), The Specter of Genocide. Mass Murder in Historical 
Perspective, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006, p. 254
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annual speeches and dread ful threats on the to tal ex ter mi na tion of Euro pean 
Jewry, read ing Ger man news pa pers an nounc ing the im mi nent de por ta tion of 
Jews, fac ing new leg is la tion, waves of de por ta tion and ru mors about the ”un think-
able” tak ing place in the East, giv ing up hope as they were liv ing in per ma nent un-
cer tainty and over whelmed by panic, they could but end up be ing men tally much 
to ex hausted to even won der that they are still alive1. Would it be enough to re al-
ize what was the life of a ”saved” Ro ma nian Jew at the time?
The de ci sion of the Ro ma nian gov ern ment to cre ate its own na tional agency 
in charge with Jew ish af fairs rather than ac cept ing Nazi (SS) nomi nees to deal 
with, the clum si ness, op por tun ism and cor rup tion of the Ro ma nian bu reauc racy, 
Ion An tonescu’s stud ied in de pend ence, Radu Lecca’s visit to Ber lin from au gust 
1942 that went badly wrong, the high-pow ered lob by ing from the Ap os tolic Nun-
cio, the Swiss and the US am bas sa dors, and Queen Mother He lena, the in ter ven-
tions of some Jew ish lead ers, Ro ma nian poli ti cians and heads of the Ro ma nian 
Or tho dox Church, in ter na tional pres sures, the evo lu tion of the war on the East ern 
front, Ro ma nia’s at tempts to de sert the Axis and pre pare the grounds for an ad van-
ta geous, less catas tro phic peace with the West ern al lies and so on; are al to gether is-
sues that are equally sig nifi cant and help ful in un der stand ing the proc ess that 
ul ti mately led to Ro ma nia’s dis en gage ment from the Nazi Fi nal So lu tion. Most if 
not all of them have been al ready con sid ered and some times re con sid ered by 
other his to ri ans, over es ti mated or, con versely, un der es ti mated. In an at tempt not 
to dou ble the ef forts of other schol ars, though I re al ize that it is rather unlikely to 
suc ceed en tirely, I will place and ana lyze the above-men tioned fac tors in a wider, 
Euro pean con text. The dy namic of the Fi nal So lu tion at large, the Nazi per spec tive 
on the events, their plans, ex pec ta tion and so on; might help in un der stand ing 
some in ner de vel op ments of Ro ma nia’s semi-in de pend ent geno cide.
A Ro ma nia free of Jews and other eth nic and re li gious mi nori ties was for Ion 
An tonescu and his re gime a ma jor po liti cal as pi ra tion and a his tori cal leg acy for 
the fu ture gen era tions of Ro ma ni ans. As a re sult, start ing with June 1941 the Ro ma-
nian gov ern ment, backed by state in sti tu tions and agen cies, im ple mented an eth-
nic clean sing pol icy that took them, step by step, from se lec tive mass kill ing to 
ghet toi za tion, de por ta tions, evacua tions, fi nally emi gra tion, a for mer, long-aban-
doned by that time, Nazi strat egy2. Some three hun dred thou sands Ro ma nian and 
Ukrain ian Jews died along the road, with yet an other three hun dred thou sands 
sur viv ing the war as Ro ma nia’s gov ern ment de cided at a cer tain mo ment to fail 
its ally stan dards and radi cal pol icy, and dis en gage with the Fi nal So lu tion, a de ci-
sion that was mo ti vated less by hu mani tari an ism and more by do mes tic and in ter-
na tional pro tests and in ter ven tions, mas sive bribe, and a rap idly chang ing mili tary 
and po liti cal situa tion3.
From late 1942 on ward, in Ro ma nia, po liti cal and mili tary tac tics and cal cu la-
tion gradu ally down played radi cal, elimi na tion ist anti-Semi tism, with out to tally 
1 Mihail SEBASTIAN, Jurnal. 1935-1944, Leon VOLOVICI (ed.), Humanitas, Bucureşti, 
pp. 409, 410, 436, 456, 464, 468, 471, 474, 517. 
2 Radu IOANID, The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania, Bolder, New York, 
1990, p. 226. Also Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol şi Mareşalul Antonescu. Relaţiile germa-
no-române. 1938-1944, Romanian transl. by S. Neagoe, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 283.
3 Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 
2007, p. 349.
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eradi cat ing it – up to 1944, at least Ion An tonescu con tin ued to jus tify his “right-
eous pol icy” in terms of re venge and sur vival, re peat edly ex press ing his re grets 
that he re frained from de port ing all Jews from Ro ma nia1. Ro ma nia’s abrupt and 
un fore seen de fec tion took the Ger mans by sur prise. Nazi of fi cials never gave up 
hope, con tin ued to sway, pres sure and, fi nally, even threaten the Ro ma ni ans to 
hand over their Jews, and ad vised the An tonescu gov ern ment to stay in line with 
the im ple men ta tion of the Fi nal So lu tion as it was al ready too late for them to per-
suade the West ern al lies on their in no cence when it comes to the Holo caust2. Yet, 
stub bornly re fus ing to loose ini tia tive and con trol over their Jews at the hands of 
the Nazi bu reau crats, a situa tion they dis liked as it por trayed them as pup pets 
and or di nary Execu tion er ies, some of the Ro ma ni ans con tin ued with the des per-
ate ef forts to con stantly de part from the Nazi plan, bravely op pos ing when not 
cun ningly mock ing Ger man dip lo mats and the SS.
By late 1941, the Ro ma nian eth nic clean sing op era tions in Bes sara bia and 
North Bukovina, a com bi na tion of ran dom and se lec tive mass kill ing and de por ta-
tions to Trans nis tria, a re gion where the Ro ma nian gov ern ment de cided to col lect 
the Jews as to lat ter push them over the Bug river, into Rus sia, where it was for the 
Ger mans to ”fin ish the job”, were rap idly com ing to an end3. The Ro ma ni ans were 
speed ing the de por ta tions, with out re al iz ing that the Ger mans were un able and 
un pre pared to cope with the situa tion. At a mo ment the Ger mans had no other so-
lu tion than to per suade the Ro ma ni ans to op er ate more sys tem ati cally, as to slow 
down the ac tion4. Soon there af ter, with the Ro ma ni ans hav ing in mind a Jew ish 
Ques tion solved in an over night proc ess, anx ious to turn to the Jews of Re gat, Ba-
nat, and South ern Tran syl va nia as to ”make room for Ro ma nian refu gees”5, and 
with Trans nis tria over crowded and a bu reau cratic night mare, it was not dif fi cult 
for the Ger mans to con vince the two An tonescu to ac cept a new plan: de por ta tion 
to Lub lin area. By the end of July 1942 the two parts reached an agree ment to start 
the de por ta tion with Sep tem ber 10. The rest was but a mat ter of tech ni cali ties and 
for mali ties to be lat ter on set tled by bu reau crats – Radu Lecca’s visit to Ber lin was 
de signed to bring for the fi nal ar range ments6. Once the de ci sion has been taken, 
with not one op pos ing it in Bu cha rest (nor in Ber lin), there were no rea sons for the 
Ger man part to fear, or at least doubt that the Ro ma ni ans would change their 
mind. The only, oth er wise small but not in sig nifi cant, prob lems un der lined in the 
case of Ro ma nia were the high level of wide spread cor rup tion, and the way Ro ma-
ni ans de fined Jew ish ness in terms of re lig ion rather than race. As for the rest, in 
1 ANIC, Fond PCM, dosar 166/1940, file 98-99.
2 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., pp. 699-702; also Saul 
FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., pp. 450-451, 483; Jean ANCEL, ”Archival Sources 
concerning the Holocaust in Romania”, in Mihail IONESCU, Liviu ROTMAN (eds.), The 
Holocaust and Romania. History and Contemporary Significance, Editura Semne, Bucureşti, 2003, 
pp. 100-101. Romanians went as far with their attempts to improve Romania’s image in the West 
as to falsify and destroy documents. Ancel explains the differences between Romanian and 
German reports on the same events this way. Though, the possibility of Germans writing reports 
when also distorting facts as to suit their interest (i.e. protect careers) should not be eluded.
3 Jean ANCEL, ”Archival Sources concerning the Holocaust in Romania”, cit, pp. 93-98. 
4 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 304-305; Jean ANCEL (ed.), Documents Concerning the Fate 
of Romanian Jewry during the Holocaust, vol. IV, New York-Jerusalem, 1985-1986, doc. 148, p. 293.
5 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., p. 168.
6 Ibidem, p. 169.
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Ro ma nia, like in Slo va kia and Croa tia, and unlike in Hun gary, there was no need 
to send an ad viser (and ex pert) on the Jew ish Ques tion1. Some of the Na zis were 
that trust ful as to rush to an nounce pub licly that Ro ma nia will be soon (read 1943) 
turned ”free of Jews”, thus set ting, once more, an ex am ple for other coun tries to 
fol low2. Yet, un ex pect edly, on Oc to ber 13, 1942, the Ro ma nian gov ern ment de-
cided to halt de por ta tions, and with out an nounc ing the de ci sion pub licly3. The 
Ger mans were to find out only lat ter about the ally drew back. What went wrong 
for the Nazi’s? Armin Heinen con sid ers that the ex ist ing so cial and eco nomic 
bounds, and the same net work of re la tions and struc tures that pre vented the radi-
cali za tion of Ro ma nian anti-Semi tism be fore the war, worked for the strat egy of 
some Jew ish lead ers and as to stop the de por ta tions to Po land4. I am per son ally in-
clined to think that haz ard played an equally sig nifi cant role in the de ci sion-mak-
ing proc ess. ”Ra tional choice” shaped the new stra te gic logic of the Ro ma ni ans 
yet, up to Au gust 1944, at least when it comes to the fate of the Jews, noth ing was 
ev er last ingly set tled. Keep ing in mind that the Na zis had the means and strength 
to im pose their vi sions by co er cion, at least as much as to se cure com pli ance, struc-
tures, ra tional choice, even brav ery would not have suf ficed.
Ro ma ni ans stood on the Nazi side in the geno cidal mire, and huge pro por-
tions of Ro ma nian and Ukrain ian Jews per ished at the hands of the Ro ma nian gov-
ern ment. Ion An tonescu knew di rectly from Hit ler, and from the very be gin ning, 
that the ”Job was thought and dirty”. Yet, he de cided to give up hu man feel ings 
and com pas sion. There was lit tle or no need for any form of Ger man par tici pa tion 
to ”cleanse the ground” as vio lence was trig gered by the de gree of lo cal anti-Semi-
tism ex ist ing be fore the war, backed by an ger, big otry, op por tun ism, ma te ri al ism, 
ca reer ism and mili tary dis ci pline. With Odessa, the great est mas sa cre in the en tire 
Holo caust, Ro ma nian mass kill ings turned geno cidal5, reach ing a pick only to 
slow down there af ter. More over, the per spec tive changed dra mati cally once the 
Ro ma nian gov ern ment turned to the Jews of Re gat, Tran syl va nia and Ba nat.
One ma jor ex pla na tion for the Ro ma nian shift and rift would be that the kill-
ings were gradu ally turn ing geo poli ti cally dis ad van ta geous. The West ern al lies 
let Bu cha rest know from the very be gin ning that they dis liked and were dis gusted 
by any form of radi cal anti-Se mitic meas ures and pol icy, with the Ro ma ni ans pay-
ing at ten tion and be com ing ”sen si tive” only af ter Stalin grad6. At the be gin ning of 
the war against USSR, the situa tion looked to tally dif fer ent to their eyes due the al-
li ance with an un de feated, even in ex pug na ble Ger many, which left them with the 
im pres sion of be ing mili tary pow er ful and po liti cally un touch able, turn ing them 
ar ro gant enough to re move any bar rier and to tally dis re gard po ten tial con se-
quences. That would suf fice to make pos si ble the dis play of le thal vio lence by a re-
gime aim ing to eth ni cally cleanse the na tion.
1 Gerhard SCHOENBERNER (ed.), The Wannsee Conference and the Genocide of the European 
Jews, Gedenkstatte Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz, Berlin, 2002, pp. 107-108, doc. 7, 8, 9.
2 ”Rumanien wird Judenrein” and ”Judenaussiedlung”, Bukarester Tageblatt, 8 August 1942.
3 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., p. 170.
4 Armin HEINEN, ”Locul pogromului de la Iaşi în cadrul Holocaustului Românesc”, in 
George VOICU (ed.), Pogromul de la Iaşi, 28-30 iunie 1941. Prologul Holocaustului din România, 
Polirom, Iaşi, 2006, p. 130.
5 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy…cit., p. 305
6 Ibidem, pp. 306-307.
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An other ex pla na tion would be that what worked in the case of Bes sara bia 
and Bukovina, did not for the rest of the Ro ma nian prov inces, as the gov ern ment 
di vided it strat egy in time and ge og ra phy over the means to do it. In the East, Ro-
ma nian army and gen dar me rie fought and ex ter mi nated the en emy, the ”Bol she-
vik Jew”, win ning the war and clean sing the land thus go ing hand in hand. Kill ing 
in the east was for the Ro ma ni ans right eous, by no means a mat ter of keep ing bal-
ance be tween pleas ing the Ger mans and achiev ing their own goals. The full com-
mit ment was ideo logi cally jus ti fied and fu eled by ha tred of Jews, com mu nism, 
and USSR al to gether, and pushed as far as to limit the flexi bil ity to ward West ern 
al lies, even when it be came ob vi ous that Ger many was loos ing the war. In Re gat, 
Tran syl va nia and Ba nat a dif fer ent strat egy was needed, as Jews were in the eyes 
of both the au thori ties and the do mes tic popu la tion not only cul tur ally dif fer ent, 
but also less dan ger ous, less poor, and more in te grated than the Jews in the East. 
Hun gar ian Jews were per ceived as dis loyal and as a ”fifth col umn” of the neighbor-
ing coun try, but far less dan ger ous than the Rus sian, ”Bol she vik Jews”. Ion An-
tonescu him self stated in dif fer ent mo ments that the Re gat, Tran syl va nia and 
Ba nat Jews will not suf fer, mean ing de ported, unless proven as com mu nists or 
sym pa thiz ers of Ro ma nia’s ene mies, Eng land and USA in cluded1. He also prom-
ised since 1941 that, in prin ci ple, the gov ern ment would pro tect all Jews who were 
Ro ma nian citi zens be fore 19142. How ever, those sus pected as hos tile to Ro ma nian 
army and peo ple were to be de ported as well, with the gov ern ment alone to de-
cide over who, when, and on what charges is ”guilty” or not. More over, pro tec tion 
was but tem po rary, with the fate of all Ro ma nian Jews to be de cided later, with the 
con clu sion of the war, as part and by means of an ”in ter na tional…eq ui ta ble so lu-
tion to the Jew ish ques tion”3. Far from be ing saved, pro tected, trusted, the Jews 
were sim ply tol er ated as long as they ac cepted to en tirely sub mit to the state and 
the re gime4. At the time, Feb ru ary to Oc to ber 1942, de por ta tion to Po land, and 
Trans nis tria, were not to tally and for ever elimi nated from the agenda, at least 
some per sonal agen das.
De por ta tions to Trans nis tria con tin ued for a short while, and at a slow pace, 
than stopped. De por ta tions to Po land never really started, though eve ry thing was 
in place. Were the Ro ma ni ans loos ing their ap pe tite and zeal, turn ing more cau-
tious5? Where they pleased with what was al ready achieved? Where they fright-
ened by the na ked re al ity lay ing be hind the Nazi ”in ter na tional so lu tion”, a con cept 
used as to de ceive their part ners and thus bring down any re sis tance to ward de por-
ta tion to the ex ter mi na tion camps in Po land? This hy pothe sis is not to be ex cluded 
as the ini tial un der stand ing by the Ro ma nian gov ern ment of an in ter na tional so lu-
tion eluded the full ex tend of Nazi pol icy and goals from late 1941 on ward.
The in va sion in Rus sia took many of the lead ers of the Third Reich from plans 
of ex pul sion and com men su rate popu la tion deci ma tion as the cen tral vi sion and 
1 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 283.
2 Dinu C. GIURESCU, România în al doilea război mondial, cit., p. 144.
3 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Evreii din România între anii 1940-1944, vol. III, 1940-1942: Perioada 
unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, Hassefer, Bucureşti, 1997, pp. 126-127, doc. 428.
4 Ibidem, pp. 126-127, 175-176, doc. 428, 469.
5 Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., pp. 478-479. Most of Antonescu’s fol-
lowers within the second and third echelons were not fanatics, mono-maniacally obsessed with 
the Jewish question, but rather bigoted, violent, corrupted, opportunistic, less zealous and lac-
king racial conceptions, like the Slovaks.
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so lu tion to ward a Europe free of Jews to sys tem atic to tal ex ter mi na tion1. Pre vi ous 
short and long range ”plans for the set tle ment of the Jew ish ques tion in the Ger-
man sphere of in flu ence in Europe af ter the con clu sion of peace”, in clud ing over-
seas evacua tion and the crea tion of res er va tions in a ter ri tory in the East ”yet to be 
de ter mined”2, were rap idly aban doned. Nazi demo graphic en gi neer ing, fan ci ful 
but im pos si ble to carry out, was to be re placed by a new pol icy3. Some where be-
tween July and Oc to ber 1941 Nazi anti-Se mitic pol icy shifted rap idly from emi gra-
tion and ex pul sion to physi cal ex ter mi na tion4. By No vem ber 1941 Chelmo and 
Bel zec were al ready op era tional, and the plan an nounced even to the press, 
though it was not quite clear if the com pre hen sive pro gram of de por ta tion to the 
Gen eral Gov ern ment also meant physi cal ex ter mi na tion. By early 1942, with the 
Fi nal So lu tion in full swing, most Nazi ”pen cil push ers” and ”ex per tocrats”, even 
the ”stuffy old For eign min is try”, de parted from pre vi ous plans of forced emi gra-
tion and re lo ca tion, and be gin think ing of the un think able as some thing that can 
and has to be achieved5. Yet, with the Wann see Con fer ence mak ing clear the 
method, pri ori ties, co or di na tion, tasks, ju ris dic tions and so on6, and with the ex-
perts in Jew ish mat ters in all agen cies em bark ing for the new est pol icy, there were 
still many not grasp ing it or at least not know ing ex actly whether the start was 
real or false7. More over, some top Na zis even re sisted the Fi nal So lu tion and re-
belled against the Führer, ”cau tiously feel ing their way and with not a lit tle cyni-
cal dou ble-deal ing”8. Con sid er able room for criti cism, ini tia tives, and lim ited 
op po si tion to poli cies sanc tioned by Hit ler was still pos si ble when and if backed 
by other rec og nized needs and pri ori ties such as the war ef fort, short ages of la bor 
force, strength en ing or pre serv ing al li ances and so on. Few were able to com pre-
1 Robert GELLATELY, ”The Third Reich, the Holocaust, and Visions of Serial Genocide”, 
cit., pp. 255-256, 258. From 1939 the Nazis initiated the fanciful General Plan East, developed in fi-
ve stages, and revised three times, turning demographic engineering into a major radical opera-
tion. The plan proved technically unworkable, and turned into an invitation to serial genocide. 
By November 1941 the RSHA drafted a version that called for resettlement of no less than 31 mil-
lions from all West areas to the East, with the ”undesirables” to be replaced by 10 million ethnic 
Germans. By April 1942 the Reich ministry for occupied Eastern Area was in charge with the im-
plementation of this plan, which is, most probably, the plan Mihai Antonescu referred to latter 
on, when emphasizing the lack of logic from part of the Nazis who opposed deportation to 
Transnistria and evacuation of Jews over the Bug.
2 Ibidem, p. 247.
3 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution. The Evolution of Nazi Jewish 
Policy, September 1939-March 1942, University of Nebraska Press, Yad Vashem, Lincoln, Jerusalem, 
2004, pp. 102-106.
4 Ibidem, p. 424. Emigration was forbidden by October, on orders issued by Heinrich Müller, 
the head of Gestapo. The same month, even before, the first deportation from Berlin, Vienna, 
Prague and the overcrowded ghettos of Poland started.
5 Robert GELLATELY, ”The Third Reich, the Holocaust, and Visions of Serial Genocide”, 
cit., p. 256.
6 Christopher BROWNING, ”The Decision Concerning the Final Solution”, in François 
FURET (ed.), Unanswered Questions. Nazi Germany and the Genocide of the Jews, Schocken Books, 
New York, 1989, p. 112.
7 Ibidem, pp. 105, 118. In October the pieces were falling together and the decision was confir-
med. The plan was signaled since July, but the organized anarchy and Byzantine style of the go-
vernment that cultivated uncertainty delayed the initiation of the Final Solution for months.
8 Heinz HÖHNE, The Order of the Death’s Head. The Story of Hitler’s SS, Penguin Books, 
London, 2000, pp. 398-399.
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hend the new vi sion, pano ramic and radi cal ized, and con se quently give up the 
idea, and their vested in ter ests with Ger man iz ing the con quered ter ri to ries in the 
East for the next dec ade, and con soli dat ing the proc ess af ter gen era tions, as for 
them the re set tle ment of eth nic Ger mans was equally im por tant to solv ing the Jew-
ish Ques tion1. The poly cratic na ture of the ”weak dic ta tor ship of con sen sus”2, 
marked by con flict ing poli cies and per son ali ties, gen er at ing pa raly sis and in de ci-
sion for a short while3, dou bled by the fact that the fac to ries of death were not all 
ready and work ing at full ca pac ity, and the sup ply sys tem was not run ning prop-
erly yet4, was but to slow the proc ess in the first months of 1942.
When it came to ex tract ing the Jews from al lied and sat el lite coun tries, which 
was no easy task in some cases, with agree ments to be reached and sen si bili ties 
not to be hurt, other de lays oc curred. One ma jor ex pla na tion comes with the fact 
that the SS and the For eign Of fice were rather com pet ing that work ing to gether, 
go ing into a con flict gen er ated by the SS at tempts to fully con trol the op era tions, 
and the dip lo mats ef forts to pre serve their ju ris dic tion5. Sec ond, the Oth ers Jews 
were not a pri or ity for the Ger mans at the very be gin ning, with the Jews from the 
Al treich, Aus tria, the Pro tec tor ate of Bo he mia and Mo ra via, than Wartegau, tar-
geted as the first for ”evacua tion” in the Gen eral Gov ern ment. Fur ther more, 
Roma and Sinti, and Poles were to fol low, with the Na zis never to fell short of vic-
tims. There fore, no rush was needed when it came to other coun tries and ter ri to-
ries, at least not at an early stage6.
When it comes to Ro ma nia, and from a pre sent day per spec tive, one can say 
that the Na zis ”missed the mo ment”. How ever, at the time, they had no rea son to 
worry as Ro ma nia was do ing fine, be ing ad vanced, set ting an ex am ple for oth ers 
in terms of will ing ness to deal rap idly with its Jews. By late 1941 the im pres sion 
left by the Ro ma nian’s speeded kill ings and de por ta tions was that all bar ri ers 
have been re moved, with the An tonescu gov ern ment anx ious to set tle the Jew ish 
Ques tion in a mat ter of months, and not with ”the vic to ri ous con clu sion of war 
against USSR”, as it was ini tially en vi sioned in Ber lin7. Nev er the less, Ro ma nian 
Jews were not in cluded in the first wave of de por ta tions be cause of the ex ist ing in-
ner con flicts within Nazi cir cles of de ci sion mak ers. In spite of Franz Rade macher 
ef forts, ”who went be yond com pli ance”, to have the de por ta tions ap proved by 
the Ro ma ni ans, Un der sec re tary of state Mar tin Lu ther, his im me di ate su pe rior, 
sent the af firma tive an swer from the Ro ma nian gov ern ment to Adolf Eichmann 
1 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit. pp. 108-109.
2 Robert GELLATELY, ”The Third Reich, the Holocaust, and Visions of Serial Genocide”, 
cit., p. 241.
3 Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., p. 336. Facing opposition from the go-
vernment on various issues concerning the German but not East Jews Hitler had to force the 
hand of Reichstag and impose a second Enabling Act in April 1942, granting him unlimited 
powers, placing Führer’s principles above law.
4 Ibidem, pp. 490-492. From a logistical point of view, the deportations were a constant factor 
of stress, at least up to 1943, gave head aches to the Nazis, who never had enough trains, not 
exactly when they needed them, as the Reihsbahn was failing short with providing sufficient 
freight cars as there were always other priorities. See also Raul HILBERG, ”The Bureaucracy of 
Annihilation”, in François FURET (ed.), Unanswered Questions…cit., pp. 123-125.
5 Heinz HÖHNE, The Order of the Death’s Head…cit., p. 281.
6 Christopher BROWNING, ”The Decision Concerning the Final Solution”, cit., pp. 114-115.
7 Robert GELLATELY, ”The Third Reich, the Holocaust, and Visions of Serial Genocide”, 
cit., p. 250. 
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only on 10 Janu ary 19421. From a Nazi per spec tive this did not meant too late, as 
the de por ta tion and ex ter mi na tion of Ro ma nian Jews be came a pri or ity only with 
au gust 1942, when they were in cluded on Himmler’s agenda2. Mean while, Ro ma-
nia was placed in the same group of coun tries with Slo va kia and Croa tia, with Slo-
va kia turned this time by the Na zis’ wish ful think ing into a role model3. Man fred 
Von Kill in ger and Franz Rade macher were send to Ro ma nia to con tinue the fruit-
ful work they started in Slo va kia, where they pre pared the ground for de por ta-
tions up to the mo ment when they were able to give green light to RSHA, with 
”the Slo vak gov ern ment to be con sulted out of cour tesy”4.
By Oc to ber 1942, Bu cha rest was crowded with Ger mans ex perts and ad vis ers 
for the Ro ma nian gov ern ment, some Ger man Po lice of fi cers in cluded, all pushy 
and opened to col labo ra tion, ready to help the Ro ma nian gov ern ment di rectly5. 
As Gus tav Rich ter’s de tailed re ports in di cate, a lot of ”pa per work” has been 
donned in ad vance by both Na zis and Ro ma nian agen cies as to speed and in sure 
the suc cess of the planned de por ta tions6. With time pass ing by, and no trains leav-
ing for Po land from Ro ma nia, the Ger mans started to put more and more pres sure 
on the Ro ma ni ans, later on even threats. Met with in creas ing op po si tion by some 
mem bers of the Ro ma nian gov ern ment and ad mini stra tion, at least the Bu cha rest 
based ex perts and dip lo mats could do noth ing but watch, write re ports to Ber lin, 
pro test, fi nally turn ing more and more frus trated with each and every failed at-
tempt to take over con trol and physi cally po lice the Ro ma nian Jews to Lub lin 
area. Ro ma nia was no oc cu pied or sat el lite coun try, but an ally, which forced 
many of them to be pru dent, as too much pres sure over the Ro ma ni ans to hand 
over their Jews might have jeop ard ized the mili tary al li ance and Ro ma nia’s eco-
nomic con tri bu tions to the war ef fort. Kill in ger’s brief ings with Mi hai An tonescu, 
and the re ports sent to Ber lin by SS Hauptsturm führer Rich ter, point to the fact that 
they were both aware and con cerned with the evo lu tion of Jew ish Ques tion in Ro-
ma nia, and the in ter ven tions of some Ro ma ni ans in fa vor of the Jews. How ever, 
all they could do was to threat that time will come for the ”sabo teurs” to pay the 
bill7. Not even top dip lo mats in Ber lin, such as Lu ther, could do more than at tempt-
ing to per suade the Ro ma ni ans that a radi cal change of their pol icy to ward the 
Jews would not im prove Ro ma nia’s im age world wide, but only in di cate a crack in 
the Axis, and weak ness from the part of Bu cha rest lead ers8. As for the SS, Himmler, 
Hey drich, Müller, Eichmann, they were hands tight, as they could only work for 
de tails but not de cide on Ger man Grand Pol icy and high di plo macy. It was the 
Führer’s job to come up with the ”broad brush strokes” and the fi nal de ci sions, as 
1 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit. pp. 379-380.
2 Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., pp. 480, 483.
3 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 281. Also Saul FRIEDLANDER, The 
Years of Extermination, cit., p. 373. The Slovak scenario was to be followed in Romania and other 
countries as well.
4 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., pp. 637, 643.
5 Jean ANCEL (ed.), Documents…cit., vol. IX, pp. 461-463. For the Order Police and its role as 
one of the main instruments in the implementation of the Final Solution see Raul HILBERG, 
”The Bureaucracy of Annihilation”, cit., pp. 124–126. 
6 Jean ANCEL (ed.), Documents…cit., vol. IV, pp. 197-202.
7 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., pp. 264-265, doc. 548. 
They went as far as to make their threats public, writing articles on the Romanian slaves of the 
Jews. See ”Judenknechte”, Bukarester Tageblatt, 11 October 1942.
8 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 283.
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he was the only one hav ing a pano ramic view, and the only one that could op er ate 
at the top level of An tonescu, Hor thy, Tiso, Petain and oth ers, is su ing au thori za-
tions con cern ing the po liti cally ex tremely sen si tive op era tion of ex tract ing the 
Jews from other coun tries1.
As Helen Fein’s study points out, di rect Ger man rule and SS con trol over de-
por ta tions counted more than eve ry thing else in the im ple men ta tion of the Fi nal 
So lu tion2. Com par ing the cases of Ro ma nia and Bul garia on one hand, with Slo va-
kia and Hun gary on the other, would be more than suf fi cient, both il lus tra tive and 
il lu mi nat ing. How ever, the SS never suc ceeded in get ting more than agree ments 
with the Ro ma nian gov ern ment, though since June 1941 they re peat edly at-
tempted to take con trol and co or di nate the op era tions en tirely – se lec tive mass kill-
ing and de por ta tions from Bes sara bia and Bukovina at the time3. The Ro ma ni ans 
re fused to sur ren der their pre roga tives, and SS in trigues and in tru sions in Ro ma-
nia’s do mes tic pol icy were ut terly re jected. Pride was one fac tor, dis trust from Ion 
An tonescu to ward the ”black tu nics” an other. The Ro ma nian Con du că tor pre ferred 
to rely more on the For eign Of fice for the sim ple fact that Ger man dip lo mats in ter-
ven tions lib er ated him from prison in 1940, and lat ter on, in Janu ary 1941 Ger man 
di plo macy ”put the money” on the Gen eral, while the SS sup ported the fas cist, le-
gionar coupe4. From that mo ment ahead An tonescu had but con tempt for the SS, 
sus pected them of work ing with his le gion ari ene mies, and as to jeop ard ize his po-
si tion5. The only per son who had the means and skills to in ter vene in fa vor of the 
SS, like in Hun gary, chang ing Hor thy with a pup pet re gime as to fi nally tackle the 
Jew ish ques tion, was Hit ler6. Yet, Hit ler pre ferred to con tinue to per suade An-
tonescu, and per son ally lived with the im pres sion that he suc ceeded in his ef forts, 
that the Jews are the arch en emy that ul ti mately have to be de stroyed7. Con se-
quently, Ro ma nia was not oc cu pied, though the plan to do so in the case of an 
even tual de fec tion ex isted. There were even good rea sons for Hit ler to or der so 
since April 1943, when he in formed An tonescu on ten ta tive ap proaches by Ro ma-
nian min is tries to the West ern al lies, and com plained and dis ap proved the Ro ma-
nian mild anti-Se mitic meas ures8. Com ing from Hit ler’s part, not to put some iron 
in the glove could only mean that he was con vinced that the glove was made of 
iron it self. As a mat ter of fact, An tonescu’s loy alty and the sup port of the Ro ma-
nian army were never doubt by Hit ler, not even af ter he re fused to of fer the Ro ma-
ni ans some sat is fac tion while re turn ing North Tran syl va nia back to Ro ma nia. 
An tonescu was not only an ally but also an ac com plice, the only for eign states man 
to whom Hit ler was ready to tell in ad vance about the at tack on USSR and the war 
of an ni hi la tion to be car ried out there, as the Ro ma nian army ”had to be put 
broadly into the pic ture”. Pos si bly, Hit ler felt that no harsher terms were needed 
1 Michael BURLEICH, The Third Reich…cit., pp. 630-631.
2 Helen FEIN, Accounting for Genocide, Free Press, New York, 1979.
3 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., p. 64.
4 Heinz HÖHNE, The Order of the Death’s Head…cit., pp. 289-290.
5 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., pp. 62-63. See al-
so Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., pp. 24-25, 29, doc. 359, 364.
6 Ian KERSHAW, Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis, vol. 2, Penguin Books, London, 2000, pp. 627-628. 
Also Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., p. 405. 
7 Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., p. 636. On August 5, 1944, Hitler ma-
de a last attempt to persuade Antonescu change his mind and deport the Romanian Jews. 
8 Ian KERSHAW, Hitler…cit., pp. 582-583.
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when it came to the Ro ma ni ans Jews as he might have hoped that the epi sode of 
June-Oc to ber 1941, when An tonescu ”unleashed his thirst ing for re venge troops” 
and al lowed hor ri fy ing mas sa cres as to of fer sat is fac tion to the Ro ma nian peo ple 
and army, would genu inely re peat it self1.
Be fore de por ta tion of the Ro ma nian Jews to Po land (Lub lin area) to take shape, 
Ro ma ni ans im ple mented, some what in de pend ently, other, simi lar plans. By July 
1941 the Ro ma nian gov ern ment thought to de port all Jews from Bes sara bia, 
Bukovina, and some coun ties of Moldova to Trans nis tria. ”Bol she vik” Jews and 
many oth ers from the Re gat, Tran syl va nia and Ba nat were to be de ported as well 
soon there af ter. No prepa ra tions have been made, as de por ta tion was only tem po-
rary, Trans nis tria but a dump ing ground, with the Jews to be evacu ated shortly 
(pushed, thrown, as the per pe tra tors put it) over the Bug River, into USSR2. Speed-
ing the proc ess on their own, they could not re al ize that, with the ad vent of Bar-
barossa, Hit ler, Himmler, and Rosenberg turned Rus sia into a fated land of Ger man 
ex pan sion, where no ex pul sion of Jews was to be al lowed, and where the ex ist ing 
Jew ish popu la tion was to be ex ter mi nated3. Un in formed as they were, they could 
not grasp the logic of the Ger mans, push ing back the Jews de ported to Moghilev in 
July, shoot ing 12 000 out of 25 000. With Trans nis tria con quered and turned into a 
ter ri tory un der Ro ma nian ad mini stra tion, Ro ma ni ans con tin ued to de port there 
the ”un de sir ables”, still hop ing to ex pel them lat ter to Rus sia. By Au gust 1941 Mi-
hai An tonescu in formed the Ro ma nian cabi net on his pre vi ous dis cus sions with 
sev eral Nazi of fi cials – rather third eche lon ex perts, proba bly Rich ter, than high-rank-
ing of fi cials, as he put it – con cern ing the im ple men ta tion of an ”in ter na tional so lu-
tion” to the Jew ish Ques tion, mean ing evacua tion to the East. Up to De cem ber 1941 
Ion An tonescu con tin ued to think that ”the ques tion of the Yids is be ing dis cussed 
in Ber lin. The Ger mans want to bring the Yids from Europe to Rus sia and set tle 
them in cer tain ar eas, but there is still time be fore this plan is car ried out”4.
This was no Ro ma nian dread ful imagi na tion at work, only ”wish ful think ing” 
based on a for mer Nazi plan from 1939-1940. The Ro ma ni ans knew about it since 
June 1940, when the Ion Gigurtu cabi net ex pressed his in ten tion to col labo rate 
with the Ger mans and solve the Jew ish Ques tion by means of evacua tion and re lo-
ca tion to the East, where a res er va tion for the Euro pean Jews was to be cre ated5. 
How ever, by mid 1941, the plan was al ready out dated as a new vi sion emerged 
from within the lead er ship of the Third Reich, some what bring ing the Ro ma nian 
pol icy of eth nic clean sing to a dead lock6. As to find a way out, Ro ma ni ans were to 
be per suaded to give up ex pe di ency, halt de por ta tions, re nounce their plans and in-
stead ac cept the new Ger man so lu tion and method7. With Ion An tonescu de ter-
mined to move fur ther and de port all Jews from Ro ma nia to Trans nis tria, resil iently 
stat ing that noth ing was to stop him at a na tional and Euro pean level from do ing 
so, Ger man ex perts work ing as ad vis ers for the Ro ma nian gov ern ment had to 
1 Ibidem, pp. 383-384. 
2 Jean ANCEL, ”Archival Sources concerning the Holocaust in Romania”, cit, p. 98. 
3 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit., p. 109.
4 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., pp. 64-67.
5 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Evreii din România între anii 1940-1944, vol. II, Problema evreiască în 
stenogramele Consiliului de miniştri, Hassefer, Bucureşti, 1996, p. 365, doc 126., see also ASB, Fond 
PCM, Cabinet, dosar 478/1941 file 110,112, 120, 153, 158, 239.
6 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., pp. 280-281.
7 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., pp. 678-686.
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make sus tain able ef forts as to con vince the Ro ma nian Con du că tor’s hench men to 
de port the Jews from Re gat and Tran syl va nia to Po land1.
In late 1941 Radu Lecca and Gus tav Rich ter con vinced Mi hai An tonescu to 
cre ate the Cen trala, a new agency that was to fa cili tate the co or di na tion and con trol 
of the Ro ma nian gov ern ment of Jew ish ac tivi ties, or gan ize forced la bor, and col-
lect con tri bu tion for the war ef fort2. By March 1942 Franz Rade macher tested, once 
more, the readi ness of the Ro ma nian gov ern ment to de port its Jews, and with 
some prom is ing re sult. Ro ma nian Jews liv ing out side Ro ma nia, in Euro pean coun-
tries un der Ger man con trol were aban doned at the hand of the Na zis3. With Ro ma-
nia soon to be in cluded in the con ti nen tal wide Fi nal So lu tion, the Na zis wanted 
to make it sure that they are not to be met with re sis tance.
Dur ing the Wann see Con fer ence in Janu ary 1942 this was one of the main is-
sues to be dis cussed, with Mar tin Lu ther, Un der sec re tary of state of the For eign Of-
fice en sur ing Hey drich that the path was cleared in South East ern Europe with 
none of the gov ern ments there to cre ate any prob lems to the RSHA when it comes 
to de port ing their Jews4. In the case of Ro ma nia, pre vi ous at ti tudes and de vel op-
ments in di cated but will ing ness and open ness from the Ro ma ni ans to col labo rate 
with the Ger mans. By that time, the Ro ma ni ans al ready de ported more than half of 
their Jews, with Mi hai An tonescu writ ing per son ally to Himmler, ask ing him to 
send his ex pert, Gus tav Rich ter, whose ex per tise ”proved es sen tial”, back to Ro ma-
nia5. True, Ro ma ni ans were not ready to fully give up their pre roga tives and ju ris-
dic tion, as they were still long ing for a Ro ma nian so lu tion, in some re spects dif fer ent 
from the Ger man one6. To Hey drich and his al ways sus pi cious RSHA this was a 
soundly in di ca tor of the Ro ma nian gov ern ment re luc tance, even op po si tion to the 
new pol icy. For Kill in ger, in form ing the For eign Of fice in Sep tem ber 1941 that Hey-
drich’s re port is in ac cu rate, as the Ro ma ni ans proved to be radi cal, it was sim ply a 
mat ter of time, and prepa ra tions7. By No vem ber 1941, even Kill in ger, the ”trou ble-
shooter”, was to in form Ber lin that the Ro ma ni ans are some what dou ble-cross ing 
them, that the only to be trusted in Bu cha rest is Ion An tonescu, with the rest of the 
Ro ma nian poli ti cians and the bour geoi sie be ing rather anti-Ger man8.
With July 1942 doubts van ished once more, with Mi hai An tonescu is su ing an 
or der com ing di rectly from Ion An tonescu: the Jews of Ba nat and South Tran syl va-
nia were soon to be de ported to Po land. More over, Ger man agen cies to gether 
with the Ro ma nian ones were to carry it out9. Gus tav Rich ter rushed to let his su-
pe ri ors in Ber lin that he ac com plished his mis sion. By 26 July Hey drich and even 
Eichmann were in formed that the prepa ra tions started, and that, fol low ing the Slo-
vak sce nario, de por ta tions will be gin with Sep tem ber 10, 194210. Able-bod ied Jews 
were to be de ported to forced la bor, loos ing Ro ma nian citi zen ship and as sets once 
1 Jean ANCEL, ”Archival Sources concerning the Holocaust in Romania”, cit, pp. 98-99. 
2 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., p. 689.
3 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit. p. 379.
4 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu...cit., pp. 325-326. 
5 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea I-a, cit., p. 383, doc. 274.
6 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu...cit., pp. 326-7.
7 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., pp. 7-8, doc. 343.
8 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu...cit., p. 328.
9 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 282. 
10 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., p. 692.
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they cross the bor der1. Some Ger mans of fi cials, such as Mar tin Lu ther, were still 
un pleased with the ”gen eral at ti tude” of the Ro ma nian gov ern ment and by the 
too many ex empted from de por ta tion cate go ries of Jews. Yet, the pro posed strat-
egy was not to put fur ther pres sure on the Ro ma ni ans who, ”in prin ci ple” were go-
ing in line with the Ger man plan. In stead, Radu Lecca was to be in vited to Ber lin 
to work with the Nazi bu reau crats on the last de tails2. In the mean time, sev eral 
Ger man news pa pers ed ited in Ro ma nia and the Reich an nounced pub licly the ”in-
evi ta ble de por ta tion” of the Ro ma nian Jews, with the Ro ma nian press re frain ing 
from do ing so3. What made the dif fer ence be tween the Ro ma nian and the Ger man 
at ti tude re mains some what un clear. Fur ther de vel op ments sug gest that for the Ro-
ma nian gov ern ment the suc cess of the en tire op era tion was con di tioned by se-
crecy more than any thing else. At the same time, the Na zis had to propa gan dis ti cally 
ad ver tise each and every mili tary, po liti cal, dip lo matic and ideo logi cal suc cess of 
the re gime, as to let the do mes tic popu la tion back home that Ger many is not 
alone, that trust wor thy al lies are fight ing on its side, and so on and so forth. Fi-
nally, a cer tain dos age of typi cal Nazi ar ro gance, in this par ticu lar case com ing at 
least from Gus tav Rich ter, is not to be eluded.
In vited to Ber lin for Au gust ”to sort out the de tails”, Radu Lecca, the head of 
the Ro ma nian Jew ish Com mis sar iat ”was brusquely treated by For eign Min is try of-
fi cials, who thought they were dis cuss ing de tails with an oily rag rather than mak-
ing de ci sion with a ship’s of fi cer”4. Franz Rade macher, the Jew ish ex pert of the 
For eign Of fice, and Lu ther’s di rect sub or di nate was the only of fi cial who took the 
time to talk to Lecca. This time it was not only for ar ro gance and in fatua tion to ruin 
the Nazi plans. The ex ist ing con flict be tween RSHA and the For eign Of fice5, as well 
as the fact that out of ”clum si ness” Mar tin Lu ther missed to in form his su pe ri ors on 
the is sues dis cussed at Wann see – go ing with the wind, a per fect op por tun ist and 
ca reer ist, Lu ther wanted but to se cure a per sonal ju ris dic tion and thus im prove his 
po si tion within the min is try –, of fended not only Lecca, but also Ion An tonescu. For 
the Ro ma nian Con du că tor the way his en voy was treated in Ber lin was in dica tive 
for the Ger man gen eral per cep tion of Ro ma nia as a sec ond rate ally and easy to han-
dle executant (and exe cu tioner), and not an equal part ner. For An tonescu, a vain glo-
ri ous mili tary and au thori tar ian poli ti cian with a ”stud ied in de pend ence”, 
sus pi cious to ward and an noyed by any Nazi in trigue, in tru sion, and pres sure, this 
in ci dent might have made the dif fer ence be tween de port ing or not the Jews of Re-
gat, Ba nat and Tran syl va nia to Po land6. Any how, his de ci sion to halt the op era tion 
was not a mat ter of hu man is tic self-re flec tion over deeds and ter ri fy ing out comes.
With Lecca’s re turn from Ber lin, the gen eral at ti tude of the Ro ma nian gov ern-
ment changed, but the ”dip lo matic in ci dent” can not ex plain it en tirely7. The Ger-
mans, first the Bu cha rest le ga tion, than Ber lin, con tin ued to hope and be pushy, as 
long as to their mind the ne go tia tions with the Ro ma nian part were con cluded. 
1 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 282, also Radu IOANID, Evreii sub re-
gimul Antonescu...cit., pp. 328-329.
2 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., p. 693.
3 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu...cit., pp. 329-30. 
4 Michael BURLEICH, The Third Reich….cit., p. 659.
5 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 282, nota 51
6 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu...cit., p. 338.
7 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., pp. 694-695.
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Con versely, and some what un ex pect edly, Ro ma nian of fi cials start claim ing that 
the de por ta tions have to be post poned, the plans stud ied and worked in fur ther 
de tails, and the op era tion launched ”when the time will come”1. For some one fa-
mil iar ized with the ”back and forth” os cil la tion of Ro ma nian pol icy, and with the 
de por ta tions start ing as to be stopped shortly af ter, the situa tion must have been 
un pleas ant but not des per ate. Unless, but, for tu nately for the tar geted vic tims, 
this was not the case, the Ger mans would have re al ized that by mid to late 1942 
the Ro ma ni ans were gradu ally turn ing dis ap pointed, loos ing their en thu si asm 
and ini tial exu ber ance2. Con tra dic tions and even con flicts be tween cabi net mem-
bers and de ci sion mak ers soon sparked, as some re al ized that they have to be 
more cau tious. The fact that the ”se cret of de por ta tions” to Lub lin was out days af-
ter the dis cus sions be tween Mi hai An tonescu and Nazi of fi cials, with room ers 
spread ing fast – seem ingly, the in for ma tion tran spired from the Cen trala and clerks 
of the Ro ma nian Rail ways –, gen er at ing a wave of in ter ven tion and pro tests, was 
one good rea son to do so. On Sep tem ber 29, 1942, Mi hai An tonescu in formed his 
close as so ci ates that the Jews found out the se cret, a proof of how much in fil trated 
and dan ger ous they can be, also spread ing lies and cre at ing panic – lo cal au thori-
ties in Ba nat were fright ened at the time that Ger man refu gees from Ger many will 
be brought in stead3. How ever, the plans to de port the Jews, ”hun dreds of thou-
sands of them”, with ”one hun dred thou sand in Bu cha rest alone”, were not aban-
doned, as they were none the less the en vis aged so lu tion to press ing prob lems 
– such as mak ing room for Ro ma ni ans, whether refu gees or not. Ini tia tives com-
ing from bu reau crats work ing at both the cen tral and lo cal level were to reach 
Lecca’s of fice who, on his turn, far from re ject ing or op pos ing, was to en sure them 
that ac cord ing to the state pol icy ”all Jews that are not use ful to Ro ma nian econ-
omy are to be evacu ated to Po land”4. The only prob lem at the time was gen er ated 
by the in de ci sion of the cabi net whether to de port the Jews, ”too many and too 
dan ger ous for pub lic or der and state se cu rity”, to Po land and/or Trans nis tria, Ro-
ma nia’s Gen eral Gov ern ment5.
On Sep tem ber 22, 1942, Mi hai An tonescu met Hit ler, Rib ben trop, and Ger-
man army com mand ers in Vin nytsa, Hit ler’s new head quar ter in Ukraine, at a con-
fer ence or gan ized to ana lyze the situa tion on the East ern front, but not only. As 
usu ally, Hit ler asked for more but re fused to of fer some thing, from mili tary equip-
ment to po liti cal sat is fac tion – in the case of Ro ma nia, his prom ise to re turn North 
Tran syl va nia with the vic to ri ous end of the war. The is sue of de port ing the Jews to 
Po land was also touched, with Rib ben trop in ter ven ing for the first time since the 
be gin ning of the ne go tia tion, in sist ing that Ro ma nia should keep its prom ises, and 
with An tonescu not re fus ing him openly6. In some re spects, it looked like when the 
Ger man For eign Min is ter found out about Hit ler’s plans and wishes for sure, and 
I would say, too late7. Days lat ter, a some what ir ri tated and pan icked Rib ben trop 
1 AMAE, Fond 33, dosar 17, fila 100. 
2 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., p. 695.
3 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Problema evreiască…cit., p. 441, doc 145. Also IDEM, Perioada unei 
mari restrişti, partea a II-a, pp. 261-262, doc. 545.
4 Jean ANCEL (ed.), Documents…cit., vol. IV, p. 276.
5 AMStM., RSEM.900, C1224.
6 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., pp. 170-171.
7 Christopher BROWNING, ”The Decision Concerning the Final Solution”, cit., pp. 101-102, 
117. Before that moment, Ribbentrop did not considered necessary to put pressure on Romanians 
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asked Lu ther to pres sure Ger many’s south east Euro pean al lied and sat el lite coun-
tries to de liver their Jews, ”to ac cel er ate as much as pos si ble the evacua tion” of the 
”proven” arch-ene mies that ”in cite against us and have to be con sid ered re spon si ble 
for sabo tage acts and as sas si na tion at tempts”1. Dif fi cult to say whether Rib ben trop’s 
(re)ac tion was de ter mined by an al ready pre dict able at the time Ro ma nian de fec-
tion. What stays un ques tion able is the fact that in less than two months Nazi of fi cials 
will have good rea sons to fear Ro ma nia’s dis en gage ment from the Fi nal So lu tion.
For Sep tem ber 26, 1942, a con fer ence was or gan ized in Ber lin by the Ger mans 
to dis cuss with the Ro ma ni ans tech ni cal is sues re gard ing the trans por ta tion of the 
Ro ma nian Jews to Po land2. Though in vited to at tend the con fer ence, most proba-
bly long be fore, the ex perts of the Ro ma nian rail ways (CFR) did not knew any-
thing about, there fore ask ing the Ro ma nian Min is try of In te rior, and lat ter Radu 
Lecca, for de tails, only as to re ceive no clear an swer in time3. The of fi cial re sponse 
reached CFR only later, on No vem ber 4, in form ing the ex perts that Ion An tonescu 
de cided on Oc to ber 13 to halt de por ta tions4. Mean while, the con fer ence took 
place, as sched uled, and in the ab sence of the Ro ma ni ans, with the Ger mans de cid-
ing on their own, and thus of fend ing the Ro ma ni ans once more, that 250 000 Ro-
ma nian Jews were to be de ported to Bel zec at a pace of 2000 every two days5. 
There were none the less good rea sons for the Ger mans to do so, as they knew al-
ready that they can not and should not rely much on the Ro ma nian bu reauc racy, 
but solely on Ion An tonescu. On Oc to ber 10, an or der is su ing from the Mar shall’s 
cabi net in structed the Min is try of In te rior to start de por ta tions from Ba nat and 
South Tran syl va nia. All of a sud den, the very next day, An tonescu re con sid ered 
his po si tion, and de cided to halt the ac tion. For mally, the rea son to ”post pone” de-
por ta tion for the spring of 1943 was to avoid the dif fi cul ties of the rainy sea son, 
and win ter6. Un of fi cially, some di rect in ter ven tions from promi nent Jew ish lead-
ers to Gen eral Picki Va siliu, none the less the con flict be tween the later and Lecca, 
with Va siliu at tempt ing to put the head of the Ro ma nian Jew ish Com mis sar iat in 
a bad light and re duce his in flu ence, counted more than any lo gis ti cal con cern7. 
Soon, it be came ob vi ous that the Ro ma ni ans de cided to leave the Ger man path 
with regard the Jewish question. Luther did not informed Ribbentrop on the Wannsee Conference 
and the Final Solution in an attempt to secure a better position for him. Piqued by the SS intru-
sion, and encroachment of his ministry jurisdiction, he gave orders to his subordinates not to 
pressure Germany’s allies with regard deportations. This is also to explain why only from late 
1942-early 1943 he got personally involved with this particular issue. This was no unusual situa-
tion considering the inner rivalry of the Third Reich, with chieftains fighting to expand their pri-
vate empires, anticipating and pursuing what they thought to be Hitler’s desires, sometimes 
erroneously, and with Hitler trying not to antagonize nor alienate any of them, not even the ones 
he considered incompetent, Ribbentrop included.
1 Quoted in Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., p. 450.
2 Jean ANCEL (ed.), Documents…cit., vol. IV, p. 250
3 ASB, Fond PCM, dosar 342/1942
4 Dinu C. GIURESCU, România în al doilea război mondial, cit., p. 144. 
5 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu...cit., p. 335.
6 Ibidem, p. 336. 
7 Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., p. 450. See also Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), 
Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, p. 260, doc. 544. On the 29 September Lecca also send a 
letter of response to the directors of CFR insuring them that Marshal ordered the evacuation of 
all Jews, and that the Ministry of Interior is working the details under the direct supervision and 
coordination of Mihai Antonescu. 
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and ”Rosenberg’s ar gu ments”, as the civi lized world was ”keep ing an eye on Ro-
ma nia, pro test ing against the mal treat ment, de por ta tions, and kill ings”1.
By late Oc to ber 1942, with the situa tion al ready tense, Mi hai An tonescu was 
tell ing Gus tav Rich ter that he does not un der stand the lack of logic of Ber lin, in sist-
ing on de por ta tion of Ro ma nian Jews to Po land, at the same time re ject ing any 
evacua tion of Jews in Trans nis tria over the Bug2. In less than a month, dur ing an-
other talk, Mi hai An tonescu went that far as to let Rich ter know that he is per son ally 
against any act of bar bar ity, criti ciz ing the abuses and crimes of the past, de ny ing 
the re spon si bil ity of the gov ern ment, de flect ing it to ward the lower eche lons of Ro-
ma nian Execu tion er ies in Trans nis tria and the lo cal Ger man Po lice3. No less anti-Se-
mitic when it came to eco nomic re forms and emi gra tion, and only 16 months af ter 
the ter ri ble mas sa cres in Bes sara bia and Bukovina, the man ad vo cat ing eth nic clean-
sing by mass kill ing and ex pul sion, turned his logic up side down, in tro duc ing to an 
ex as per ated Ger man ex pert and ad viser no less than seven ma jor rea sons for the Ro-
ma nian gov ern ment to halt de por ta tions and de part the Ger man plan4.
Driven by op por tun ism more than ide ol ogy, Ro ma ni ans re al ized by late 1942, 
early 1943 that they were ”pas sen gers on a sink ing boat”5. Af ter Stalin grad, loos-
ing hope for ever, they re con sid ered their po si tion, and made it that way as to let 
the Ger mans know that they changed their mind. By Janu ary 1943 a re port writ ten 
by Heinrich Müller was that pes si mis tic that Himmler turned con vinced that noth-
ing more could be done in Ro ma nia, none the less de cid ing to call Gus tav Rich ter 
back home6. In late 1943, Radu Lecca stepped down from his po si tion, there af ter 
work ing as a sec ond rank clerk for the Min is try of Na tional La bor7. With the 
spring of 1944 Ger man anti-Se mitic propa ganda was not longer ac cepted by the 
Ro ma nian gov ern ment, who went that far as to ban ish the ac tiv ity of Ger man ex-
perts sent to Bu cha rest to re in vigo rate it8. Last but not least, the com mis sion in 
charge with de por ta tions was work ing on re pa tria tion of Jews from Trans nis tria9.
To the very end Ion An tonescu con tin ued to hate the Jews, the ge neric Jew ish 
En emy, ”with glasses on his nose, ob serv ing eve ry thing, no tic ing the mili tary 
situa tion and in form ing the ene mies of Ro ma nia”, with yet sev eral mem bers of 
his cabi net try ing to tem per him, ad vanc ing im pos si ble so lu tions, and tak ing ad-
van tage that the Mar shal did not wanted and could not af ford to alien ate his last 
fol low ers. Though, on sev eral oc ca sions he went that far as to threaten his hench-
men, ac cus ing them for be ing pro tec tors of the Jews, stress ing the fact that ”the 
army knows” and even tu ally might seek re venge, as in 194110. Never en tirely de-
part ing his creeds, the Con du că tor con tin ued to give in ter views in Porunca Vre mii, 
re volv ing to the same old theme and ob ses sion11. When lu cid, though rarely, he 
1 ASB, Fond PCM, dosar 473, vol. II, file 854-869.
2 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., p. 696.
3 Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., pp. 450-451. See also Lya BENJAMIN 
(ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, pp. 273-274, doc. 556.
4 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu...cit., pp. 336-337.
5 Heinz HÖHNE, The Order of the Death’s Head, cit., p. 396.
6 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., p. 697.
7 Ibidem, cit., p. 673.
8 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 285.
9 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu...cit., p. 339.
10 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Problema evreiască …cit., pp. 554-555, 557, doc. 186, 187.
11 Ibidem, p. 499, doc. 160.
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real ized that Ro ma nia might lose the war. Even than, he con tin ued to trans late de-
moc racy as ”Judeoc racy”, and gave up radi cal anti-Se mitic meas ures only as to 
”lift the bur den from the shoul ders of the next gen era tions of Ro ma ni ans”1. At the 
same time he did not gave up the idea to cleanse Ro ma nia of all eth nic mi nori ties 
in the af ter math of an even tu ally vic to ri ous end of the war, turn ing the Ro ma nian 
na tion in per fect ho moge nous body, and con stantly op posed the re pa tria tion of 
Jews from Trans nis tria, as the Ro ma ni ans would ”stone” him for do ing so2. Sur-
prised that as many as 60 000 Jews were still alive in Trans nis tria in late 1943, some-
what pan icked, ask ing his min is tries to pre vent fur ther as sas si na tions by the 
Ger mans on Ro ma nian ad min is trated soil, as he would be made re spon si ble, An-
tonescu resil iently re fused to pro tect the ”in grate, venge ful na tion, plot ting con-
tinu ously against the Ro ma ni ans, who treated them hu manely and even saved 
them from an im mi nent death”3.
Ro ma nia’s case is not that spe cial, and defi nitely not sin gu lar, though to some 
it might look so. Hun gary, Bul garia, and Slo va kia also stepped back when they re-
al ized the full ex tend of the Fi nal So lu tion, halt ing the de por ta tion tem po rary or 
for good, de pend ing on the same fac tors: in ter ven tions, pro tests, situa tion on the 
front, de fec tions within the Nazi de ci sion-mak ers cir cles and chain of com mand, 
and so on4. Fi nally, di rect SS in volve ment in the op era tion made the dif fer ence, 
count ing more that pre-ex ist ing lo cal anti-Semi tism and the status of the re spec-
tive coun try vis-a-vis Ger many. In Ro ma nia, a suc cess ful coup d’État in Au gust 
1944 put an end to any fur ther de vel op ments and po ten tial Ger man in ter ven tion, 
even oc cu pa tion, forc ing the Ger mans to with draw with out hav ing enough time 
to mas sa cre more Jews and or gan ize the de por ta tions on their own5.
The situa tion of the Ro ma nian Jews liv ing Ro ma nia with the mid 1930s as to 
end trapped in Ger man con trolled coun tries with 1940-1941 is no less il lus tra tive 
for my case study. It in di cates some goal of the ini tial anti-Se mitic clean sing pol icy, 
the rea sons be hind the late 1942-1943 shift, and the lim its of the Ro ma ni ans at-
tempt to pro tect its Jews.
From the very be gin ning Ro ma ni ans ex pressed no in ter est on the re turn of 
their Jews, on con trary. Not nec es sary thank ful like the Croats, they had an at ti-
tude simi lar to the Slo vaks, who only ”fret ted over their claim to the prop erty left 
be hind”6. With May 1941 the Ro ma nian gov ern ment re pealed citi zen ship to all Ro-
ma nian Jews out side the bor ders, can celed their pass port, and later, in July 1942 
handed them to the Ger mans, to be treated as the rest of the Ger man, Aus trian, 
and French Jews. Raoul Bossy’s re ports from Ber lin on Ro ma nian Jews within the 
Reich be ing dis crimi nated and treated worst than other Jews were dis re garded by 
the Ro ma nian For eign Of fice7. Fur ther more, for the sake of the good re la tions 
1 Ibidem, pp. 511, 513, doc. 166, 168. Less than a month later he was to say that the interest of 
the Romanian nation had to be protected no matter how many Jews would die, taking full res-
ponsibility in front of history and the United States of America.
2 Ibidem, pp. 524, 525- 529, 534, 541-542, doc. 175, 176, 178, 180. 
3 Ibidem, pp. 526, 551-552, doc. 176, 186.
4 Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., pp. 484-486.
5 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Problema evreiască…cit., p. 551, doc. 186. In April 1944 Antonescu 
speaks of a German invasion into Romania, and the possibility of German troops to engage in 
further mass killings of Jews.
6 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit. p. 379.
7 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 282.
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between Ro ma nia and Ger many, and of the ”in ter na tional so lu tion” to the Jew ish 
Ques tion, an agree ment was signed be tween Mar tin Lu ther and Gheor ghe 
Davidescu, in spite of re peated pro tests by dip lo mats to warn Bu cha rest that the 
new pol icy is but to shat ter Ro ma nia’s in ter na tional pres tige1. Davidescu went 
that far as to ask Ro ma nian dip lo mats to end their pro tests against Ger man pol icy 
to ward Ro ma nian Jews, and in stead to ”keep an eye” on the as sets con fis cated 
from them2. When Eichmann start press ing by July 1942 for a rapid an swer, as Jew-
ish refu gees from Hun gary, Ro ma nia, Slo va kia were to be de ported from Ger-
many, France, Bel gium and Hol land, smoothly and with out meet ing any 
dip lo matic op po si tion3, the Ro ma nian For eign Of fice came rap idly with a posi tive 
re sponse. By the time, the For eign Of fice was act ing ac cord ing to the state pol icy, 
which was to ”get rid of the Jew ish mi nor ity as much as pos si ble”4.
With 1943 the situa tion changed. Thou sands of vi sas were is sued for Jews to 
re turn to Ro ma nia, and not to be sent to Trans nis tria5. At tempts were made to of-
fer some pro tec tions, and make sure that the Ro ma nian Jews are not dis crimi-
nated. How ever, all those ef forts were in vain as Ger man au thori ties resil iently 
re fused to let them re turn. More over, they re minded the Ro ma nian gov ern ment 
that they aban doned their Jews long be fore6. To tally un re al is tic, Mi hai An tonescu 
and oth ers, some times the same dip lo mats that in 1942 worked with and for the 
Ger mans, con tin ued to make (or at least pre tended to) dip lo matic ef forts to pro-
tect, lib er ate and re pa tri ate some Jews, even those that al ready reached the fac to-
ries of death7. At a cer tain mo ment, in 1944, from Ber lin, Ion Gheor ghe had to ask 
them halt fur ther in ter ven tions, as they were not only coun ter pro duc tive but also 
dan ger ous for Ro ma nia, with the Na zis in ter pret ing them as ”acts of en mity”8.
Docu mented or not, many (though one might say not enough) in ter ven tions, 
per sua sions, brib er ies, and pres sures, com ing from Jew ish lead ers and Or gani za-
tions, the Vati can, USA, Ro ma nian poli ti cians, the Red Cross and so on; also con-
trib uted to the de vel op ments that fi nally made the Ro ma nian dis en gage ment 
with the Fi nal So lu tion pos si ble9. Most of, but not all per son ali ties and or gani za-
tions aim ing to stop the dread ful ma chin ery are men tioned in a spe cial re port re-
quested by Ion An tonescu in late Janu ary 194410. This is not the first re port of that 
kind, which points to the rele vance of all the ef forts briefly men tioned above. With 
the be gin ning of the kill ings and de por ta tions, SSI and other state agen cies and in-
sti tu tions in formed the gov ern ment on re peated at tempts by oth ers to sof ten the 
radi cal anti-Se mitic pol icy11. What was the rea son for An tonescu to ask for such a 
re port in early 1944 we might never find out. On one hand it seems that the Ro ma-
nian leader wanted to know who the sabo teurs of his pol icy were, let the Ger mans 
1 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., p. 692.
2 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., pp. 367, 373, doc. 616, 622.
3 Ibidem, pp. 362-363, doc. 613.
4 Ibidem, p. 372, doc. 621.
5 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., pp. 171-173.
6 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Evreii din România între ani 1940-1944. vol. IV, Bilanţul tragediei – 
renaşterea speranţei, Hassefer, Bucureşti, 1998, p. 423, doc. 384.
7 Ibidem, pp. 424-5, 428, 429, 448, 453, doc. 385, 388, 389, 406, 411.
8 Ibidem, pp. 452, doc. 410.
9 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu...cit., pp. 335-337.
10 ASB, Fond PCM, Cabinet, dosar 163/1940, file 87-93. 
11 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., pp. 69-70, doc. 383.
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know as well, and thus come up with an ex pla na tion for fail ing their ex pec ta tions. 
On the other hand it can be a des per ate ef fort to cover his back, let ting the West ern 
al lies know that he, Ion An tonescu, took into con sid era tion the in ter ven tions and 
halted the ac tions. How ever, some pre vi ous dec la ra tions of the Mar shal, from Au-
gust 1942, point rather to the for mer1.
How much each and every in ter ven tion counted is also hard to es tab lish. 
Keep ing in mind the con text, one would say what Hil berg said in the case of baron 
Franz von Neu mann: ”What he did was a ma jor act with a ma jor re sult”2. Or, as 
Jean An cel did when ana lyz ing the po liti cal op po si tion and in ter ven tion of some 
de moc ratic lead ers such as Iuliu Maniu, Dinu Bră tianu, Nico lae Lupu, and oth ers, 
con clude that ”it was de ci sive and in flu en tial”3. Franz von Neu mann bribed some 
of fi cials. Maniu and Lupu acted as a chan nel of com mu ni ca tion be tween Jew ish 
lead ers and or gani za tions, and the Ro ma nian gov ern ment, per suad ing the au-
thori ties to stop the de por ta tion, and of fer ing them ar gu ments in fa vor of freez ing 
the proc ess, ar gu ments that were later used by Mi hai An tonescu both to op pose 
the Na zis as well as to per suade the al lies: the Jew ish ques tion as a Ro ma nian prob-
lem, not Ger man, one of the most im por tant and to be solved by Ro ma nian means; 
stop ping the de por ta tions and other radi cal anti-Se mitic poli cies as to sat isfy the 
at mos phere in the al lied camp and thus give Ro ma nia a bet ter chance to pre pare 
the peace talks and con di tions in the af ter math of the war; Ro ma nia acts to ward 
the Jews as Slo va kia and Croa tia, and unlike It aly and Hun gary, thus leav ing the 
in ter na tional com mu nity with the im pres sion that its gov ern ment is fully de pend-
ant on the Third Reich; and so on4.
Sev eral Jew ish lead ers also played a sig nifi cant role, Wilhelm Filder man be-
ing only the most visi ble, ex ploit ing per sonal re la tions and in sti tu tional con nec-
tions, send ing memo ran dums and let ters of pro tests, cor rupt ing, brib ing and so 
on; with, some times, his in ter ven tions be ing but ”tac ti cal blun ders”5. How ever, 
his role was sig nifi cant up to the mo ment when the Fed era tion was dis banded, 
and Filder man forced to step down6, and Cen trala, a Ro ma nian ver sion of Juden rat, 
su per vised by Radu Lecca, act ing upon Ger man in struc tions, and headed by ”ut-
terly un rep re sen ta tive for the Jew ish com mu nity (even) con tro ver sial” mem bers 
such as N. Gin gold, H.S. Stre iman and A. Will man, was cre ated7. There af ter, his 
role con sisted not that much in in flu enc ing di rectly the Ro ma nian gov ern ment to 
change their de ci sion to de port the Jews to Po land, but per suad ing them to con tinue 
to take maxi mum ad van tage of the eco nomic and fi nan cial po ten tial, and know-how 
of the re main ing Jews, thus keep ing them alive. Ac cord ingly, Ro ma nian Jews were 
1 Jean ANCEL (ed.), Documents…cit., vol X, p. 215.
2 Raul HILBERG, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders. The Jewish catastrophe, 1933-1945, Harper 
Collins Publisher, New York, 1992, p. 154.
3 Jean ANCEL, ”The Opposition to the Antonescu Regime: its Attitude Towards the Jews 
during the Holocaust”, in David BANKIER, Israel GUTMAN (eds.), Nazi Europe and the Final 
Solution, Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, 2003, p. 345.
4 Jean ANCEL, ”The Opposition to the Antonescu Regime”, cit., pp. 352-355.
5 Bela VAGO, ”Contrasting Jewish Leadership in Wartime Hungary and Romania”, in 
Yehuda BAUER, Nathan ROTENSTREICH (eds.), The Holocaust as a Historical Experience, Holmes 
& Meier Publishers, Inc., New York, 1981, p. 139.
6 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., p. 288, doc. 565.
7 Bela VAGO, ”Contrasting Jewish Leadership in Wartime Hungary and Romania”, in cit., 
pp. 140-142. 
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not saved by the gov ern ment, but kept as hos tages, as ”bar gain ing chip”, none the-
less the source of uni mag in able large sums of gold and for eign cur rency1.
In a simi lar way, Al ex an dru Zissu took ad van tage of Mi hai An tonescu’s fe ver-
ish seek from 1943 on ward for a way out of the war, ”adroitly ex ploited the myth 
of a om nipo tent ’Jew ish World Power’, and hinted to the Ro ma nian prime min is-
ter that Jew ish or gani za tions might me di ate with the al lies for Ro ma nia”2.
Writ ing re ports and pro test ing against de por ta tions and mas sa cres as with Oc-
to ber 1941, per suad ing and than, with Sep tem ber 1942, di rectly warn ing and 
threat en ing the Ro ma nian gov ern ment, ef forts by US Em bassy in Bu cha rest and lat-
ter the Ameri can gov ern ment, also made the dif fer ence3. Ar ro gantly, the Ro ma ni-
ans de cided at the be gin ning to dis re gard the warn ings and ig nore the dip lo matic 
pres sure by US gov ern ment, with few re fus ing to work for and be ing as so ci ated 
with a gov ern ment that per se cutes the Jews4. None the less, unlike Ion An tonescu, 
Mi hai An tonescu was cau tious and sen si tive from the early days when it came to 
Ro ma nia’s im age in the USA, ask ing Ro ma nian dip lo mats to ”coun ter act Hun gar-
ian propa ganda on Ro ma nian bar bar ity”, lat ter ”ex plain ing” the ac tions while re-
duc ing them to ”some radi cal meas ures against the Bol she vik Jews”, end ing up 
with de ny ing re spon si bil ity for per se cu tions and po groms5.
Two docu ments are more than il lus tra tive in this sense. On March 12, 1944, 
the Ro ma nian am bas sa dor in An kara in formed the Ro ma nian gov ern ment that 
three is sues make the spe cial in ter est of the US gov ern ment, and that a fa vor able 
an swer from Ro ma nian au thori ties would be ac cepted ”…with sat is fac tion, and 
please the Ameri can am bas sa dor, who is more Jew ish than Ameri can”:
1. The re pa tria tion of 50 000 Jews from Trans nis tria, thus re duc ing the risk of 
fur ther mas sa cres by the Ger man army dur ing its with draw from Rus sia;
2. Di rect sup port for the emi gra tion of 4500 Jew ish chil dren and 500 adults 
to Pal es tine;
3. Grant ing the Jews of Cer nowitz the free dom to travel in the event of an im-
mi nent evacua tion of the re gion6.
Two days later, Mi hai An tonescu was to in form the am bas sa dor that start ing 
with March 13 his gov ern ment de cided to re pa tri ate the Jews (and ad mini stra tion 
from Trans nis tria) as to avoid mas sa cres simi lar to those that oc curred in 1941. He 
also ex pressed his sup port to ward emi gra tion, as he al ways was in fa vor and 
viewed emi gra tion as a so lu tion. Lastly, he ex pressed per sonal hope that it will not 
be the case for Ro ma nia to aban don Bukovina (mean ing that that the US gov ern-
ment will in ter vene in fa vor of Ro ma nia in the af ter math of the war). The rest of 
the docu ment is but an as ton ish ing and shame less at tempt to im prove the im age of 
Ro ma nia and him self, an un be liev able posi tive ret ro spec tive of Ro ma nia’s pol icy 
1 Even the Nazis saw them this way up to December 1941, when USA entered the war, tur-
ning it into a world war, and it would be rather hard to say that they ever attempted to save any 
Jew. After that moment it was senseless for them to keep Jews as hostages. See Saul 
FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., p. 583, also Robert GELLATELY, ”The Third 
Reich, the Holocaust, and Visions of Serial Genocide”, cit., p. 250. 
2 Bela VAGO, ”Contrasting Jewish Leadership in Wartime Hungary and Romania”, in cit., 
p. 144.
3 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a I-a, cit., p. 451, doc. 331.
4 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu...cit., p. 333.
5 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., pp. 25-26, doc. 361.
6 AMAE, Fond 33, vol. 17, file 134-135.
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to ward the Jews, based on re forms and emi gra tion, ut terly re ject ing any per se cu-
tion, con fis ca tion, and vio lence, resil iently meet ing the Ger man plans with re fusal, 
fi nally de flect ing re spon si bil ity for the atroci ties on Ger mans alone1. Too late for 
some 300 thou sands souls, and Ro ma nia, whose leader shouted years be fore, af ter 
the first in ter ven tions: ”Let the Ameri cans come and judge me”.
With Pol ish bish ops re veal ing the Nazi atroci ties in Po land from the very be-
gin ning, and lat ter on, with the de por ta tion and ex ter mi na tion proc ess gal va niz-
ing to ac tion, and trig ger ing in ter ven tions from Pa pal Nun cios, the case of Vati can 
is equally im por tant. In some cases, Slo va kia, Hun gary, France, Ro ma nia; the Nun-
cios – Giuseppe Burzio in Bra ti slava, An gelo Rotta in Bu da pest, and An drea Cas-
sulo in Bu cha rest – spared no en ergy in dis semi nat ing in for ma tions, re veal ing the 
truth be hind ”de por ta tions”, act ing as chan nels of com mu ni ca tion, pres sur ing di-
rectly or in di rectly gov ern ments, brib ing of fi cial when ever pos si ble, pro tect ing 
Jews by means of con ver sion to Chris ti an ity in coun tries were Jew ish ness was de-
fined in terms of re lig ion2.
Though less docu mented, with the ”smok ing gun” still miss ing, Cas sulo’s in-
ter ven tion in Ro ma nia, might have con sisted of, and counted as much as Burzio’s 
in Slo va kia: dis semi nat ing in for ma tions about the fate of the de ported Jews, trans-
lat ing Eichmann’s euphe misms (i.e. re set tle ment into physi cal ex ter mi na tion), pro-
vid ing evi dences of the ex ist ing fac to ries of death with 19433. What is for sure is 
that many Ro ma nian Jews were con verted to Ca tholi cism, an op era tion as suc cess-
ful as to turn Ion An tonescu fu ri ous against the ”Judeo-Hun gar ian con spir acy”, 
turn ing Jews into Hun gar ian, and thus at tempt ing to save them from de por ta-
tion4. Last but not least, by 1943 and some what bluff ing, the Nun cio prom ised Mi-
hai An tonescu Vati can’s en dorse ment to Ro ma nia’s ef forts to leave the Axis and 
ne go ti ate with the al lies, in ex change for pro tec tion for the new con verted5.
Rather use less at the be gin ning, all those ef forts turned fruit ful at the end. If 
not for more, they were at least ”cor ro sive”, gradu ally shat ter ing the con fi dence of 
the Ro ma ni ans in the al mighti ness of Ger many, and there fore forc ing them to par-
tially re con sider their po si tion and pol icy. With most of the mem bers of the cabi-
net not turn ing less anti-Se mitic to the end of the war, and with the Na zis press ing 
for the de por ta tion of Jews to Po land, emi gra tion to Pal es tine and de por ta tion and 
1 AMAE, Fond 33, vol. 17, file 173-175.
2 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., pp. 645, 650-651. The Nazis were 
trying to keep the secret and deceive the Slovak, Romanians, and others that their Jews, once extrac-
ted and deported to Poland for forced labor, were subjected to a regime of ”physical conservation”, 
not extermination. Rotta was among the firsts to find out about the extermination process taking 
place in the Lublin area and spread information without waiting for more evidence. For Romania 
see Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., pp. 273-274, doc. 556. 
3 Richard OVERY, Interrogations. Inside the Minds of the Nazi Elite, Penguin Books, London, 
2001, pp. 358-359; Heinz HÖHNE, The Order of the Death’s Head…cit., p. 396, Yehuda BAUER. 
Rethinking the Holocaust, cit., p. 182, Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., p. 374. 
As Dieter Wiesliceny put it after the war the Slovak government did not knew about the fate of 
the Jews after the deportation, as extermination was a matter of secrecy. Diplomatic efforts by 
Bursio led to a halting of deportation and a request from the Slovak government for an inspec-
tion visit to Poland, refused by Eichmann. Difficult to state whether Slovaks or Romanians knew 
or not. Anyway, after being informed, it was impossible for them to say that they did not, conti-
nue to play ignorant, and refuse to acknowledge reality.
4 AN, Fond PCM, dosar 179/1942, file 174-175.
5 ASB, Fond PCM, dosar 353/1943, file 1-3, 56-61, 63-68, 122-126. 
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re lo ca tion to the East, mean ing Trans nis tria in this par ticu lar case, both faint ech-
oes of long aban doned Ger man plans, are il lus tra tive in this sense1. Not be ing that 
stu pid as not to re al ize that the Ger mans are no longer sup por tive to ward the out-
dated old-new ap proaches of the Jew ish Ques tion, the Ro ma ni ans were bright 
enough as to turn them into al ter na tives, and a per fect ex cuse for not de port ing 
the Jews of Re gat, Ba nat, and Tran syl va nia to Po land. In fact, as the Ro ma ni ans 
put it, they were not pro tect ing or sav ing the Jews, nor were they de fect ing the Ger-
man Fi nal So lu tion, but sim ply go ing back to the origi nal plans as the could not 
cope with the hasty dy namic of Nazi pol icy. In other words, eth nic clean sing op-
era tions con tin ued by other means, with the gov ern ment mak ing even some 
profit out of it in some cases, at the same time sig nal ing the al lies that Ro ma nia 
took a dif fer ent path2. The Na zis could not do much, though they pro tested and 
on sev eral oc ca sions op posed and even at tempted to jeop ard ize the Ro ma ni ans 
un work able plans. None the less, to the very end they hopped that the Ro ma ni ans 
will re turn to radi cal meas ures3.
Up to 1944, the Ger mans op posed emi gra tion from Ro ma nia, and made ef forts 
to stop it by all means and at all lev els. How ever, as they could not reach Ion An-
tonescu, all they got were noth ing more than prom ises from Mi hai An tonescu that 
the is sue will be re con sid ered4. Not even the in ter ven tions of the Ger man gov ern-
ment, but not Hit ler, in any case not di rect in ter ven tions, no mat ter the threats, and 
long list of ideo logi cal (ra cial prin ci ples), po liti cal and mili tary ar gu ments could 
not de ter mine the Ro ma ni ans to halt emi gra tion5, which went rather slow, as the 
Ro ma nian gov ern ment re fused any di rect in volve ment in co or di nat ing the op era-
tions, and re frained from pro vid ing the Red Cross, and Jew ish Or gani za tions with 
means of trans por ta tion. Fac ing crit ics from the West ern al lies, pro tests and threats 
from the Ger mans, and cor rup tion from his own bu reauc racy, Ion An tonescu de-
cided in late May 1944 to halt emi gra tion ”till the state will be able to or gan ize it on 
se ri ous grounds”6. Con sid er ing the rather small num ber of Jews that left Ro ma nia 
as to reach Pal es tine af ter a long and un safe voy age, one can only con clude that emi-
gra tion did not mat tered much in sav ing the Ro ma nian Jews. It served only to de-
ceive the al lies, and as an ex cel lent ex cuse for de part ing the Ger man so lu tion.
Para doxi cal as it might seem, the very ex is tence of Trans nis tria as an al ter na-
tive space where the Ro ma ni ans could de port their Jews, as well as other cate go-
ries of ”un de sir ables” also en dan gered the Nazi plans. From mid 1941 up to late 
1942, Ro ma ni ans did not give up the idea to evacu ate Jews un der their con trol to 
this re gion. Noth ing was or gan ized in ad vance, as from there the de port ees were 
to be later pushed over the Bug, into Rus sia7. Ger man lo cal and cen tral au thori ties 
pan icked, pro tested, and op posed the Ro ma ni ans, from the high est to the low est 
level of com mand, by means of dip lo matic pres sures and ne go tia tions down to 
kill ing and plun der ing ex pe di tions by the lo cal Ger man Po lice in Trans nis tria, 
which was un der Ro ma nian ad mini stra tion yet, with the Ro ma ni ans not know ing 
1 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., pp. 282-283.
2 Ibidem, pp. 283-284.
3 Ibidem, pp. 285-286.
4 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Bilanţul tragediei – renaşterea speranţei, cit., pp. 387-388, doc. 350.
5 AMAE, Fond 33, vol. 17, file 102-107.
6 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Bilanţul tragediei – renaşterea speranţei, cit., pp. 395-397, doc. 357, 358. 
7 IDEM (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., pp. 202-203, doc. 490. 
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how to re act, and with thou sands of Jews mas sa cred in the spring of 19421. In 
many re spects Trans nis tria was but the out come of a dead lock of Ro ma nian pol icy 
to eth ni cally cleanse Ro ma nia, a dead lock gen er ated by the lack of com mu ni ca-
tion be tween the Ger mans and the Ro ma ni ans, and there fore a clash of two vi-
sions. Lat ter on, and when con ven ient, as to prove their in de pend ence when 
re fus ing to de port their Jews to Po land, the Ro ma ni ans could turn to their dump-
ing ground, their Gen eral Gov ern ment. With time pass ing, and Ro ma nia de sert-
ing the Nazi Fi nal So lu tion, Trans nis tria also served to de ceive the Ger mans.
The hor ren dous mass kill ings of 1941 that to gether with Trans nis tria make the 
core of the Ro ma nian Holo caust rep re sented for the An tonescu re gime com po-
nents of an in stru men tal eth nic clean sing pol icy. Though a pow er ful po liti cal tool, 
mass kill ing was never turned by the Ro ma ni ans into an end in it self, ex cept for the 
case of Odessa. It is rather dif fi cult to claim that the Ro ma ni ans in tended to ex ter mi-
nate the en tire Jew ish popu la tion of Ro ma nia at large. Their goals were rather ”lim-
ited”, at least when it came to the Re gat and Tran syl va nia and Ba nat: force the Jews 
to sub mit, give up as sets, con trib ute to war ef fort with huge amount of money, ac-
cept force la bor and needed be, de por ta tions. More over, with the pas sage of time, a 
physi cal so lu tion to the Jew ish ques tion turned im prac ti cal, not only geo poli ti cally, 
but also fi nan cially, as it was per ma nent. In other words, and by all means, it was 
”bad busi ness”. Vested in ter est made the Ro ma ni ans re con sider their pol icy, thus 
go ing from emo tional to more ra tional per pe tra tors. For most of the Ro ma nian de ci-
sion – mak ers the Jews were un wanted, an ac tive en emy at most, but not a meta his-
tori cal one2. True, Ion An tonescu’s per ma nent frus tra tion with con ven tional 
mili tary and po liti cal strat egy might have had sparked fur ther de por ta tions and 
kill ings at any time, es pe cially in 1944. Yet, in spite of the many dead locks, the other 
de ci sion-mak ers did not sup port his at tempts to turn to an ger as a mo bi li za tional 
fac tor. Some shred of com pas sion with the vic tims is not to be to tally ig nored, as to-
tal ex ter mi na tion might have rep re sented a psy cho logi cal bar rier they could not 
cross, as many oth ers. Like the Slo vaks, the Ro ma ni ans might have seen the de por-
ta tion as a huge op era tion that would ”shove off (the Jews) to the East never to be 
seen again”3, re ject ing ex ter mi na tion when they had to take the sub stan tial risk of 
alien at ing west ern al lies and in cite fur ther in ter ven tion, both do mes tic and in ter na-
tional. Thus, in stead of es ca lat ing and radi cal iz ing the anti-Jew ish meas ures, like in 
Ger many4, the cir cum stances and stakes of late 1942 to mid 1944 mild the Ro ma-
nian ones. Greed and clum si ness of Ro ma nian bu reau crats, ex pec tocrats rather than 
ex per tocrats only oiled the shift ing mecha nism, with vice play ing a more im por tant 
role than vir tue in ”sav ing” half of the Jews of Ro ma nia.
The un pre dicted de vel op ments and re sponses of the Ro ma nian gov ern ment 
to ward Nazi plans were not logi cal and natu ral. As a con se quence of the fierce 
anti-Semi tism of the pre war pe riod some of the most shock ing anti-Jew ish crimes 
were pos si ble in 1941, with the lat ter shift to less bar baric means, but with out giv-
ing up hate, made pos si ble by tra di tional prag ma tism, op por tun ism, and cor rup-
tion, which al to gether tem pered the Ro ma nian gov ern ment and made it opt for a 
1 AMAE, Problema 33, vol. 15, fila 58, also AN, Fond PCM, dosar 104/1942, fila 306.
2 Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., pp. xvii-xx.
3 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit. p. 379, also Saul 
FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., pp. 450, 452, 537. 
4 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit. pp. 426-427.
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more cau tious path1. Hard to choose the ap pro pri ate word and say that Ro ma ni ans 
halted, de ferred, de serted, dis en gaged from the Fi nal so lu tion and thus ”saved” 
half of their Jews. May be Hil berg was right when say ing that by freez ing – not ac ci-
den tally – the de por ta tions, they fell short in reach ing Ger man stan dards2. A less 
com pul sive and more com pro mis ing with late 1942 pol icy in di cates that the Fi nal 
So lu tion was not a fun da men tal is sue for the Ro ma nian gov ern ment, none the less 
that the price to be fi nally paid did mat tered for Bu cha rest. As a re sult, the Ro ma-
nian gov ern ment did not save Jews; it only lim ited the num ber of vic tims, spar ing 
their lives for an un der mined pe riod of time.
As Robert Gel lately put it for the Holo caust as a whole, ”a half cen tury has 
passed since the end of the war, and we con tinue to learn about the abuses, the per-
se cu tions, the mur der, and the may hem. We have made great strides in his tori cal 
re search, but it is no less clear that much work re mains to be done to clar ify and to 
ex plain what hap pened”3. Far from con clud ing on this epi sode, the pre sent pa per 
only at tempted to ad vo cate the need for fur ther re search on the Ro ma nian Holo-
caust, a sub ject that has not been yet ex hausted. Not nec es sar ily bring ing all pieces 
to gether, my re con struc tion sim ply ex trapo lated from events, some of the docu-
ments, tes ti mo nies, and work of other his to ri ans, thus of fer ing the reader rather re-
flec tions and shad ows, not a full scale pic ture of re al ity.
1 Bela VAGO, ”The Reactions to the Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy in East-Central Europe and in 
the Balkans”, in François FURET (ed.), Unanswered Questions…cit., pp. 227-233.
2 Raul HILBERG, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders…cit., pp. 77-84.
3 Robert GELLATELY, ”The Third Reich, the Holocaust, and Visions of Serial Genocide”, 
cit., p. 263.
